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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rise in cell phone usage in the United States, texting while
driving has grown to become a pervasive form of distracted driving,
which has created a major public safety issue with much of the focus
only on the conduct of the driver. 1 Texting, because of its inherently
distracting and mobile nature, 2 poses a serious and potentially deadly
risk of harm to others when coupled with the operation of a motor
vehicle. 3 To illustrate, in 2013, cell phone related accidents constituted
27 percent of all automobile accidents. 4 Further, it is estimated that
341,000 of those accidents were related to texting and driving, 5 where
411 of those crashes resulted in fatalities. 6 These figures demonstrate
how a driver substantially increases the likelihood of causing an accident
when he uses a cell phone to view or send texts, which exposes the
driver to liability while the text sender generally bears no responsibility. 7
*J.D. Candidate, the University of Akron School of Law, 2017. Production Editor, 2016-2017
Akron Law Review. B.A., Political Science, Kent State University, 2013.
1. Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle Electronic Devices,
78 Fed. Reg. 24818, 24824-25 [hereinafter NHTSA] (proposed April 26, 2013) (not to be codified)
(noting that the widespread popularity or use of text messaging began to rise after 2004).
2. Id. at 24820 (stating that the NHTSA believes that the task of text messaging inherently
interferes with a driver’s ability to safely control a vehicle).
3. See Joseph B. Bayer & Scott W. Campbell, Texting while Driving on Automatic:
Considering the Frequency-Independent Side of Habit, 28 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 2083, 2083
(2012) (noting that texting while driving is absurd because “[i]n addition to operating the vehicle’s
interface, obeying travel laws, traversing traffic, and locating destinations, the texting individual is
required to pinpoint and retrieve his or her mobile device, situate the current conversation, and
devise an appropriately human message . . .”).
4. Annual Estimate of Cell Phone Crashes 2013, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL (2015),
http://www.nsc.org/DistractedDrivingDocuments/Cell-Phone-Estimate-Summary-2013.pdf.
5. Id.
6. NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REP. NO. DOT HS 812 132,
DISTRACTED DRIVING 2013 (2015) (reporting that 411 distraction-affected crashes resulting in
fatalities involved the use of a cell phone).
7. But see Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 503 (App. Div. 2013) (addressing the issue
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Because texting requires the participation of at least two
individuals, the driver should not be held solely liable while the sender
of the text shares no liability. 8 While a driver owes a duty of reasonable
care not to become distracted by an incoming text, if the sender of the
text is aware that the driver is likely to become distracted by it, she
should have a limited duty not to send that text. 9 For example, in June of
2015, James Davenport, a school bus driver, “was driving while
distracted due to sending and receiving text messages,” veered into
oncoming traffic and collided with another school bus, killing two
students and a teacher’s aide. 10 If the text sender was aware that the bus
driver, who may have owed a heightened duty of care to his passengers,
was driving a school bus during the exchange of texts, the victims of
such a needless tragedy should be able to seek redress from both parties
who engaged in the texting activity. 11
Recently in Kubert v. Best, the Superior Court of New Jersey
properly extended potential liability not merely to the driver who causes
an accident due to texting and driving, but also to the sender of the
text. 12 Kubert’s holding represents a departure from traditional notions
of third-party tort liability and imposes a new duty on remote senders of
text messages. 13 While the Superior Court concluded that the evidence
presented by the Kuberts was insufficient to hold the remote text sender
liable, it held that “the sender of a text message can potentially be liable
if an accident is caused by texting, but only if the sender knew or had
special reason to know that the recipient would view the text while
driving and thus become distracted.” 14
This Article argues that states should extend liability to text senders
of whether a remote text sender may be held liable for an automobile accident caused by the
recipient); see also Phillip N. Quisenberry, Texting and Driving: Can it be Explained by the General
Theory of Crime?, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 303, 303 (2014) (“At least one study found that drivers
who text are 23 times more likely to crash relative to non-distracted drivers.”).
8. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 503.
9. See id. (holding that a remote text sender has a duty not to send a driver a text in limited
circumstances).
10. David Bailey, Tennessee Bus Driver Was Texting before Deadly Crash, REUTERS (June
5,
2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/05/us-usa-tennessee-crashidUSKBN0OL2EI20150605.
11. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW 158 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012)
(noting that “commercial and governmental operators of . . . buses . . . have long been held to owe
their passengers greater-than-ordinary care”).
12. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 503 (“[T]he sender of a text message can potentially be
liable if an accident is caused by texting, but only if the sender knew or had special reason to know
that the recipient would view the text while driving and thus be distracted.”).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 503.
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to provide victims of accidents caused by texting and driving with an
alternative mechanism of redress. Part II discusses empirical evidence
that demonstrates the societal harm caused by texting and driving and
provides the legislative background concerning the steps that states have
already taken to reduce texting while driving. Part III discusses the
holding, facts, and the “full duty analysis” that the New Jersey Superior
Court employed in Kubert v. Best to impose a new duty on remote text
senders. 15 Part IV argues that state legislatures and courts should
establish rules that impose a duty on remote persons to avoid sending
text messages to drivers if they know that the driver will view the text
and become distracted. Finally, Part IV also examines how a plaintiff
might prove a remote text sender’s negligence under Kubert.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Texting and Driving Has Produced Negative Effects in Society
Empirical evidence of the negative consequences caused by
distracted driving—and specifically texting and driving—should serve
as incentive for society to address the issue and take steps to curtail the
unsafe activity. In the United States, approximately 899,000 automobile
accidents were related to distracted driving in 2010, and at least 47,000
police-reported crashes involved a driver who was distracted by an
electronic device.16 Since then, various studies have concluded that the
activity of texting while driving is one of the most risky forms of
distracted driving. 17 Furthermore, the economic costs imposed on
society by accidents caused by distracted driving should further
incentivize society to proactively reduce distracted driving. Specifically,
a study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reported
that the economic cost of distracted driving equated to a total cost of at
least $40 billion. 18 This figure includes “losses [of] productivity, medical
15. Id. at 517 (“Our conclusion that a limited duty should be imposed on the sender [of a
text] is supported by the “full duty analysis” described by the [New Jersey] Supreme Court . . . .”).
16. NHTSA, supra note 1, at 24819, 24823.
17. To illustrate the distracting nature of cell phone use while driving, research has revealed
that there are three primary types of distractions that affect a driver’s ability to operate an
automobile: visual, manual, and cognitive. A driver is visually distracted when he glances away
from the road to “visually obtain information,” manually distracted when he removes his hand from
the steering wheel to manipulate a device, and cognitively distracted when his mental attention is
diverted from the task of driving. Some tasks, such as interacting with passengers or changing the
radio station, only distract a driver in one or two ways, while texting and driving distracts a driver in
all three ways. Id. at 24819.
18. LAWRENCE BLINCOE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE
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costs, legal and court costs, emergency service costs, insurance
administration costs, congestion costs, property damage, and workplace
losses.” 19
The societal movement to decrease incidences of drinking and
driving offers guidance on how society should approach the problem of
texting and driving. 20 Analogously, drinking and driving has resulted in
harmful societal consequences and has been fiercely combated.21
Particularly, over the last several decades, media campaigns, legal
prohibitions, and heightened public awareness of the issue led to a
decrease in accidents related to drinking and driving and, in turn,
decreased the number of deaths caused by drinking and driving. 22 To
illustrate, alcohol related accidents that resulted in a fatality declined by
23 percent from 13,099 in 2004 to 10,076 in 2013. 23 Thus, by adopting
similar techniques, particularly by increasing civil liability, incidences of
accidents related to texting and driving can also be reduced.
B. Texting-and-Driving Laws Have Been Enacted by State Legislatures
to Combat the Negative Effects of Texting and Driving
In response to the increase in accidents caused by texting and
driving, a majority of states have enacted measures to curb the
phenomenon in various forms. 24 Currently, forty-six states have enacted
a texting-and-driving ban for all drivers. 25 For example, New Jersey has
CRASHES, at 4 (2015).
19. Id. at 5.
20. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 519 (noting that the public learned of the dangers of
drinking and driving through a “sustained campaign and enhanced criminal penalties and civil
liability”).
21. See Steven Grossman, Hot Crimes: A Study in Excess, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 33, 47, 5455 (2011) (noting that advocacy groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving were successful in
raising awareness of issues such as “the problem created by the drunk driver, the overly lenient
sentences that many drunk drivers received at that time, and the need for new legislation”).
22. See Marykate E. Williams, Learning from the Past to Improve the Future: Taking A
Lesson from America’s Drunk Driving Dilemma to Cure the Current Texting While Driving
Epidemic, 41 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 253, 263 (2015) (reporting that after
states increased the drinking age to 21, drunk driving accidents involving fatalities decreased by 53
percent from 1982 to 2011).
23. NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REP. NO. DOT HS 812 102,
ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING (2014).
24. Even President Obama has taken steps to reduce texting and driving. For instance, in
2009 he issued an executive order to “demonstrate Federal leadership in improving safety on our
roads and highways” by imposing a “Federal Government-wide prohibition on the use of text
messaging while driving on official business or while using Government-supplied equipment.”
Federal Leadership on Reducing Text Messaging While Driving, 74 Fed. Reg. 51225, 51225 (Oct.
6, 2009).
25. Distracted Driving Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N (Nov. 2015),
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enacted several statutes to suppress texting while driving. Specifically,
New Jersey’s traffic regulation that bans texting while driving sets forth
penalties, which, if violated, carry monetary sanctions that may be
enhanced with each subsequent violation and may also lead to an
operator’s license forfeiture. 26 Further, partly in response to the facts
giving rise to the litigation in Kubert v. Best, the New Jersey legislature
enacted a provision within its criminal code known as the “Kulesh,
Kubert, and Bolis Law.” 27 The statute places severe criminal penalties
on a defendant convicted of recklessly causing an accident resulting in
bodily injury to another. 28 Finally, the statute permits a jury to infer that
the defendant was driving recklessly if there is sufficient proof that the
defendant violated New Jersey’s texting-while-driving statute. 29
Conversely, some states have prohibited texting and driving for
only certain classes of drivers. For example, Missouri places a restriction
on texting and driving for drivers 21 years of age or younger, in lieu of
an outright ban. 30 Texas has adopted a limited ban on specific classes of
individuals, such as drivers under 18 years of age and school bus drivers
who are driving underage children. 31 The mechanism for enforcement
also varies by state, where most states have adopted a primary
enforcement scheme, while others enforce texting while driving as a
secondary offense. 32 However, several states have not yet enacted
outright prohibitions on texting while driving for all drivers. Particularly,
states such as Arizona and Montana have not yet adopted a state-wide
ban on texting and driving. 33

http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphone_laws.html [hereinafter Distracted Driving Laws]
(“Currently, 46 states, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands ban text messaging for
all drivers.”).
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.3(d) (West 2013) (setting forth a monetary penalty of $200$300 for a first violation, $400-$600 for a second violation, $600-$800 for a third violation, and a
discretionary operator’s license forfeiture for a fourth offense).
27. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5 editors’ note (West 2012). New Jersey’s assault-by-auto
statute states: “Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving
a motor vehicle in violation of [New Jersey’s texting-while-driving statute] may give rise to an
inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(c)(1) (West 2015).
28. Assault by auto, when it involves a driver who was using a cell phone, is a fourth-degree
crime if a person was seriously injured as a result of the accident. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(c)(2)
(West 2014).
29. See supra text accompanying note 27.
30. Distracted Driving Laws, supra note 25.
31. Id.
32. Id. (noting that all but five states that ban texting while driving have primary enforcement
schemes).
33. Id.
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C. Several Courts Have Extended Liability to Passengers of Motor
Vehicles
Courts in New Jersey have recognized that passengers of
automobiles may be held liable to third-party victims for accidents
caused by the driver of an automobile. 34 Generally, while passengers
cannot be held liable for injuries to third parties based on the negligent
conduct of the driver, New Jersey courts have imposed a duty on
passengers not to interfere with the driver’s operation and control of a
motor vehicle. 35
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that a passenger
may be held liable to an injured third party if she interferes with the
driver’s control of the automobile through her own affirmative
negligence. 36 Specifically, conduct such as grabbing and turning the
steering wheel, distracting the driver’s attention from the road,
obstructing the driver’s view, and urging the driver to violate traffic
laws, such as driving under the influence of drugs, may constitute
conduct sufficient to demonstrate that the passenger interfered with the
driver’s operation of the motor vehicle. 37 For example, in Adams v.
Morris, the court held that the passenger owed a duty of care to the
third-party plaintiff after the passenger diverted the driver’s attention
from the road when the passenger asked the driver to clean a car seat. 38
Additionally, it was held in Brainerd v. Stearns that a passenger who
attempts to take control of an automobile by grasping the wheel may be
held liable for negligence when that automobile causes injury to a third
party due to an attempted commandeering of the automobile. 39 Next, the
court in Reclusado v. Mangum stated that an act that directly interferes
34. E.g., Lombardo v. Hoag, 269 N.J. Super. 36, 54 (App. Div. 1993) (citing Lind v.
Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that a passenger may be held liable to
a third party if he or she interferes with the driver’s ability to operate the vehicle)).
35. Id. (“A passenger has a duty not to interfere with the operations of the driver.”).
36. See Olson v. Ische, 343 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Minn. 1984) (“A passenger who interferes
with his driver’s operation of the motor vehicle, for instance by grabbing the steering wheel, may be
liable to others . . . .”).
37. Gregory G. Sarno, Liability of Motor Vehicle Passenger for Accident, 50 AM. JURIS.
PROOF FACTS 2d 677 § 2 (1988).
38. 584 S.W.2d 712, 716-17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (“[The passenger] diverted the driver’s
attention from the road by requesting him to clean up the seat . . . . Under such a state of facts and
circumstances, the trial court correctly concluded that appellant owed a duty to . . . the [third-party]
plaintiffs.”).
39. 155 Wash. 364, 366, 368-70 (Wash. 1930) (“The [passenger] knew, or to him is imputed
the knowledge, that the probable consequence of [grasping the steering wheel] would be to cause an
accident. Such disregard of consequences warranted the jury in finding the [passenger] guilty of
gross negligence.”).
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with a driver’s operation, such as “holding some object” in front of the
driver’s eyes, would be a breach of a statutorily defined duty not to
interfere with the driver’s control of an automobile. 40 Finally, Price v.
Halstead established that passengers may be liable to third parties for
injuries caused by an intoxicated driver if the passengers substantially
encouraged the driver’s impairment. 41
These decisions in which courts have extended liability to
passengers may serve as an important basis for courts to extend liability
to remote text senders. Appropriately, the Kubert court extended
passenger liability to include remote text senders who, under
circumstances similar to passengers that divert the driver’s attention
from the road, interfere with the driver’s operation of the motor
vehicle. 42
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT KUBERT V. BEST
A. Kubert’s Holding Places a New Duty on Remote Text Senders
Kubert’s holding imposes a new duty on remote text senders in
relation to the public who use the roadways. 43 This holding is articulated
in several different ways throughout the court’s opinion. 44 Essentially,
the court held that “[t]he sender of a text message can potentially be
liable if an accident is caused by texting, but only if the sender knew or
had special reason to know that the recipient would view the text while
driving and thus be distracted.” 45 The court explained that a sender has
“special reason to know” based on a “personal relationship or prior
experience that put a defendant ‘in a position’ to ‘discover the risk of
harm.’” 46 Thus, a sender will have breached a duty to the public who use
the roadways by distracting the driver if the sender either knew or had

40. 228 Cal.App.2d 8, 15-16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (“[A]cts which the code section is
designed to prevent . . . such as . . . blinding [the driver’s] view of the road by holding some object
in front of his eyes . . . would be [a] breach[] of the code section.”).
41. 177 W.Va. 592, 600 (W. Va. 1987) (“[A] passenger may be found liable for injuries to a
third party caused by the intoxication of the driver of the vehicle in which he is riding . . . .”).
42. Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 515 (App. Div. 2013) (stating that the court imposed
liability on remote text senders by “examining the law in [the] analogous circumstance[]” of
passenger liability).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 495, 503, 507, 514-15, 517, 519.
45. Id. at 503.
46. Id. at 517 (quoting J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 338 (N.J. 1998)) (“In J.S., the Court used
the phrase ‘special reason to know’ in reference to a personal relationship or prior experience that
put a defendant ‘in a position’ to ‘discover the risk of harm.’”).
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“special reason to know” that the driver would view the message while
driving. 47
B. Factual and Procedural Background of Kubert
In Kubert, the plaintiffs, Linda and David Kubert, were riding a
motorcycle when Kyle Best, who was driving a pick-up truck, veered
into the opposite lane and collided with the Kuberts. 48 Best stopped his
vehicle and immediately dialed 911. 49 As a result of the collision, both
Linda and David Kubert lost their left legs. 50
The Kuberts filed suit against Best in the Morris County Superior
Court in New Jersey. In preparing for the lawsuit, the Kuberts’ attorney
investigated Best’s actions on the day of the accident and discovered that
Best had been in continuous communication with Shannon Colonna via
text message and telephone throughout the day. 51 While the cell-phone
record revealed that Best and Colonna had texted each other sixty-two
times on the day of the accident, the two defendants were not in a
romantic relationship at the time, but were merely friends.52 Further,
because the cell-phone record indicated that Best sent a text to Colonna
immediately before the accident, the court reasoned that it could be
inferred that Best replied to Colonna’s text received only thirty-five
seconds earlier. 53 Seventeen seconds after responding to Colonna’s text,
Best called 911. 54 Thus, the evidence suggested that Best must have
collided with the Kuberts at some point during those seventeen
seconds. 55
The Kuberts added Colonna as a defendant to the lawsuit and their
attorney attempted to obtain the content of the text messages that were

47. Id. (“[W]hen the sender ‘has actual knowledge or special reason to know[]’ . . . from
prior texting experience or otherwise, that the recipient will view the text while driving, the sender
has breached a duty of care to the public by distracting the driver.”).
48. Id. at 503-04.
49. Id. at 504.
50. Id.
51. Id. (noting that the Kuberts’ attorney “developed evidence to prove Best’s activities on
the day of the accident” and that “they texted each other many times each day . . . .”).
52. Id.
53. The opinion appears to contain a scrivener’s error here. Specifically, it states that only
twenty-five seconds elapsed between the time when Best received Colonna’s text at 5:48:23 and
when Best responded with a text at 5:48:58. Id. at 506 (“It can be inferred that he sent [his] text in
response to Colonna’s text to him that he received twenty-five seconds earlier.”). In fact, thirty-five
seconds would have elapsed.
54. Id. at 505.
55. Id. at 505-06.
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exchanged between Best and Colonna. 56 However, the Kuberts’ attorney
did not have access to that information and neither Best’s nor Colonna’s
depositions contained what the contents of those text messages were.57
Eventually, Best settled and Colonna moved for summary judgment. 58
The trial court concluded that remote persons do not have a legal duty to
avoid sending text messages to drivers, even if the remote person knows
that the recipient is driving. 59 The Kuberts appealed the trial court’s
dismissal of their claims against Colonna to the Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court. 60
C. The Rationale of the Kubert Decision
To reach its conclusion that the sender of a text has a limited legal
duty not to send a text in certain circumstances, the Kubert court
engaged in the common law process of formulating a new duty under a
“full duty analysis.” 61 First, the court noted that a “duty is an obligation
imposed by law requiring one party to conform to a particular standard
toward another,” that defining a duty is an issue of law, and that
“determinations of the scope of duty in negligence cases has traditionally
been a function of the judiciary.” 62 Next, the court briefly stated that
imposing a legal duty requires balancing several factors, such as “the
relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the
opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the
proposed solution.” 63 Importantly, the court noted that not only does the
imposition of a duty upon a defendant need to reach a just outcome in
the specific circumstance, but that it must be a “generally applicable rule
that governs societal behaviors.” 64
The court next considered the Kuberts’ argument that Colonna
should be held liable under a theory of aiding and abetting. The Kuberts

56. Id. at 506.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 501, 506 (“[The Kuberts’] claims for compensation from [Best] have been settled
and are no longer part of this lawsuit.”).
59. Id. at 506-07.
60. Id. at 501 (“Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against the driver’s
seventeen-year-old friend who was texting the driver much of the day and sent a text message to
him immediately before the accident.”).
61. Id. at 509-10 (“The New Jersey Supreme Court recently analyzed the common law
process by which a court decides whether a legal duty of care exists to prevent injury to another . . .
[and] described [this process] as ‘a full duty analysis.’”).
62. Id. at 509, 519.
63. Id. at 510 (quoting Desir ex. rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303 (2013)).
64. Id. (quoting Desir ex. rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303 (2013)).
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cited the Second Restatement of Torts § 876, and argued that under this
Section “[A]n individual is liable if he or she knows that another
person’s ‘conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other.’” 65 Under this theory, the
Kuberts argued that Colonna was essentially “electronically present”
when she aided and abetted Best’s use of a cell phone immediately
before the accident. 66 The court acknowledged that the Superior Court of
New Jersey had previously adopted the principle set forth in § 876 and
discussed two previous cases in which the Superior Court applied the
Section to passenger liability cases. 67 Specifically, in Champion ex rel.
Ezzo v. Dunfee 68 and Podias v. Mairs, 69 the court examined whether
passengers of a vehicle could be held liable if an injury resulted from the
driver’s negligent conduct, and the court discussed each seriatim.
Champion set forth two exceptions to the general rule that a
passenger does not owe a duty to other passengers and thus permits one
passenger of a vehicle to recover against a defendant passenger under
either of two conditions. 70 First, recovery is permitted if there is a
“special relationship” that exists between the passenger and driver which
allows the passenger to have control over the actions of the driver.71
Second, recovery is permitted if the passenger “substantially encourages
or assists” the driver to engage in negligent behavior. 72 However, the
Kubert court found that the defendant neither had a special relationship
with the driver nor actively encouraged the driver to text while driving
and concluded that merely sending a text does not constitute “active
encouragement” because it does not urge the driver to immediately view
the text. 73
In Podias v. Mairs, the court considered “whether passengers in a

65. Id. at 510. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
66. Id. at 511 (“Although Colonna was at a remote location from the site of the accident,
plaintiffs say she was ‘electronically present’ in Best’s pick-up truck immediately before the
accident and she aided and abetted his unlawful use of his cell phone.”).
67. Id. at 510-13.
68. 398 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2008).
69. 394 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2007).
70. Champion, 398 N.J. Super. at 121-22.
71. Id. (“A special relationship exists where the occupant has some control over the driver, as
where the driver is in the occupant’s employ or where they are engaged in a joint enterprise or
venture.”).
72. Id. at 122 (“The other recognized exception to the rule of passenger non-liability is where
the passenger substantially encourages or assists in the driver’s tortious conduct.”).
73. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 512 (“Colonna did not have a special relationship with
Best . . . [and] the act of sending [text] messages, by itself, is not active encouragement that the
recipient read the text and respond immediately, that is, while driving and in violation of the law.”).
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car may, in certain circumstances, owe a duty to a pedestrian struck by a
driver who is either unwilling or unable to seek emergency aid or
assistance himself.” 74 Adopting § 876 of the Second Restatement, the
court concluded that third parties may be held liable on an aiding and
abetting theory if the third party gives “substantial assistance” or
encourages the driver to leave the scene of an accident and causes the
driver to neglect fulfilling his duty to assist the injured party. 75 However,
in Kubert, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that Colonna “took affirmative steps and gave substantial assistance to
[the driver] in violating the law.” 76 Thus, the court concluded that
Colonna could not be held liable for aiding and abetting the driver’s
negligent conduct. 77
While neither of these cases persuaded the court that a duty should
be imposed on the remote sender of a text under an aiding and abetting
theory, the court continued its analysis without reference to the party’s
arguments under an alternative theory of liability that runs analogous to
passenger liability. 78 The court began by citing the Second Restatement
of Torts § 303, which states that “[a]n act is negligent if the actor intends
it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect, the
conduct of another, third person, or an animal in such a manner as to
create an unreasonable risk of harm to the other.” 79 Further, the court
offers an illustration of this concept, which states: “A is driving through
heavy traffic. B, a passenger in the back seat, suddenly and unnecessarily
calls out to A, diverting his attention, thus causing him to run into the car
of C. B is negligent toward C.” 80 Based on this illustration, the court
expanded the scope of passenger liability by imposing a duty to avoid
unreasonably risky conduct that the passenger knows or has special
reason to know will distract the driver, such as urging the driver to

74. Podias, 394 N.J. Super. at 343.
75. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 513 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM.
LAW INST. 1979)) (“We [have] held that the passengers could be found liable for giving ‘substantial
assistance’ to the driver in failing to fulfill his legal duty to remain at the scene of the accident and
to notify the police.”).
76. Id.
77. Id. (“The evidence available to plaintiffs is not sufficient to prove Colonna’s liability to
the Kuberts on the basis of aiding and abetting Best’s negligent driving while using a cell phone.”).
78. Id. at 515-18 (“When the sender knows that the text will reach the driver while operating
a vehicle, the sender has a relationship to the public who use the roadways similar to that of a
passenger physically present in the vehicle.”).
79. Id. at 515 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
80. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303 cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. LAW
INST. 1965)).
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remove his gaze from the road to view a cell phone screen. 81
Finally, the court states that foreseeability, a “foundational
element” in determining whether a duty exists, is “based on the
defendant’s knowledge of the risk of injury.” 82 Next, the court reasoned
that the sender of a text takes a foreseeable risk if the sender is aware
that the recipient is driving and will view the text immediately.”83
Therefore, the court concluded that if a person sends a text to a recipient
when the sender has either actual knowledge or special reason to know
that the recipient is driving and will read the text, then the sender has,
like a passenger, “knowingly engaged in distracting conduct” and has
breached the duty of care owed to the public who use the roadways. 84
D. The Concurring Opinion’s Disagreement with the Majority’s Holding
Should Be Afforded Minimal Weight
Judge Espinosa delivered a concurring opinion in which she
concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the majority’s holding that
established a new duty rule for remote text senders. 85 The concurrence
began by emphasizing individual liability and argued that it should be
the sole responsibility of the driver to avoid distractions. 86 Further, it
stated that the majority improperly equates passengers with remote text
senders because the remote sender “lacks firsthand knowledge of the
circumstances attendant to the driver’s operation of the vehicle that a
passenger possesses and has even less ability to control the actions of the
driver.” 87 While Judge Espinosa concedes that the threshold of the new
duty rule is so high that it will rarely be satisfied, essentially she opined
that because traditional tort principles provide a sufficient analytical
81. Id. at 515-18 (“[A] passenger must avoid distracting the driver. The remote sender of a
text who knows the recipient is then driving must do the same.”).
82. Id. at 516 (quoting Podias v. Mairs, 394 N.J. Super. 338, 350 (App. Div. 2007); J.S. v.
R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 337 (1998)) (“Foreseeability of the risk of harm is the foundational element in
the determination of whether a duty exists . . . . Foreseeability, in turn, is based on the defendant’s
knowledge of the risk of injury.”).
83. Id. at 517.
84. Id. (“[I]f the sender knows that the recipient is both driving and will read the text
immediately . . . [t]he sender has knowingly engaged in distracting conduct, and it is not unfair also
to hold the sender responsible for the distraction.”).
85. Id. at 520 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (“I do not agree that it is necessary for us to
articulate a new duty specific to persons in remote locations who send text messages to
drivers . . . .”).
86. Id. at 520-21 (quoting Podias v. Mairs, 394 N.J. Super. 338, 346 (App. Div. 2007))
(“Traditional tort theory emphasizes individual liability, which is to say that each particular
defendant who is to be charged with responsibility must be proceeding negligently.”).
87. Id. at 521.
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framework for approaching the issue of remote text sender liability, it
was unnecessary for the majority to articulate a new duty rule.88
To demonstrate how basic tort principles should be the sole guide
of a court’s analysis when determining whether a remote text sender will
be held liable, the concurrence applied the passenger liability analysis
formulated under Champion to the case at bar. 89 In Kubert, because there
existed no “special relationship” between the remote sender and the
recipient-driver, this exception to passenger non-liability was not
present, and so the concurrence proceeded with its analysis under an
aiding and abetting theory based on the Second Restatement of Torts §
876. 90 In particular, the concurrence focused on the third element of
aiding and abetting under the Second Restatement, which requires that
the defendant “knowingly and substantially assist the principal
violation.” 91 To determine whether substantial assistance was present in
a particular case, the comment to the Second Restatement lists five
factors, including whether the defendant was present or absent at the
time of the commission of the tort. 92 The concurrence argued that
because a remote text sender will not be physically present in the
automobile when the tort is committed, “at least” this one factor would
weigh against holding the sender liable.93 The concurrence reasoned that
only a passenger, unlike a remote sender, can be aware of the
circumstances regarding the driver’s situation, and so only passengers
can be aware of the risks created by the driver’s conduct, whereas a
remote person who is not physically present cannot. 94
However, there are several difficulties with the concurrence’s
88. Id. at 520 (“In my view, traditional tort principles provide adequate guidance to
determine whether liability should be imposed in such circumstances.”).
89. Id. at 522.
90. Id. at 522-23 (“As the majority opinion notes, the type of ‘special relationship,’ such as
parent-child, master-servant, landlord-tenant, and guardian-ward, required to impose liability for the
conduct of another . . . was not present here.”).
91. Id. (quoting Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 84 (2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 876(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (listing five
considerations, including “the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the
defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the other and his state of
mind”).
93. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 523 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979)) (“When the tort is the driver’s use of text
messaging, it is evident that at least one of the factors—the remote texter’s absence from the
location of the tort—will weigh against liability.”) (emphasis added).
94. Id. (citing Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 398 N.J. Super. 112, 122-23 (App. Div.
2008)) (“[T]he passenger’s presence in the automobile provide[s] an awareness of the circumstances
that contribute[s] to the risk created by the driver’s conduct.”).
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analysis of this particular factor under the theory of aiding and abetting.
First, even if the remote sender is not physically present in the vehicle,
the driver is most likely operating a vehicle to reach a destination, which
will require the driver to operate a vehicle on a public road. Thus, if the
remote sender is aware that the recipient is driving, this should give the
remote sender sufficient “awareness of the circumstances” that there will
likely be other drivers in the recipient’s immediate proximity, regardless
of whether the sender has “first-hand knowledge” based on his physical
presence. 95 Also, while the sender’s absence may weigh against liability
according to the Second Restatement’s comment, this is only one of five
factors that help determine whether the sender substantially assisted the
driver’s negligent conduct. 96 Therefore, regardless of whether the text
sender is physically present in the vehicle, if a potential plaintiff is able
to prove that the sender had knowledge that the recipient was both
driving and was likely to view the message and become distracted, the
sender has sufficient awareness of the circumstances because negligent
driving upon a public highway almost certainly carries an inherent risk
of injury to others. 97
Moreover, the concurring opinion misconstrued the premise of the
majority’s holding when it states that “knowledge a text message will
‘reach the driver while operating the vehicle,’ without more, places the
remote text sender in a position equivalent to that of a passenger in the
vehicle.” 98 This misstatement lacks the other essential component
regarding the sender’s state of mind because the sender must not only
know that the recipient is driving, but also that the recipient will view
the text and thereby become distracted. 99 Consequently, when the
concurrence proceeds to analyze whether Colonna would be held liable
under an aiding and abetting theory, this important requirement is
overlooked. Particularly, when evaluating whether Colonna was aware
that she was assisting the driver’s tortious conduct, the concurrence’s
95. Id. at 521.
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (noting that
several factors should be considered in determining whether the “assistance of or participation by
the defendant may be so slight that he is not liable for the act of [another]”).
97. To illustrate this inherent risk, in 2010 there were approximately 5,409,000 policereported crashes in the United States. NHTSA, supra note 1, at 24818, 24823-25 tbl.1. VisualManual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle Electronic Devices, 78 Fed.
Reg.24818, 24823-25 tbl.1 (proposed April 26, 2013) (not to be codified).
98. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 521 (Espinosa, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 515-16 (majority opinion) (“[A]dditional proofs are necessary to establish the
sender’s liability, namely, that the sender also knew or had special reason to know that the driver
would read the message while driving and would thus be distracted from attending to the road and
the operation of the vehicle.”).
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analysis focused on whether she knew that she was “substantially
assist[ing]” the conduct. 100 In contrast, Kubert’s holding permits courts
to hold a remote sender liable when faced with evidence that the sender
merely knew or had special reason to know that the driver was likely to
view the text and become distracted.101 Thus, while the standard of
evidence proving the requisite state of mind under Kubert might be
lower than under an aiding and abetting theory, it is more realistic in
terms of deterring a text sender’s detrimental behavior, and as the
concurrence concedes, “will rarely be met.” 102
Lastly, the concurrence states that the legislature has recognized the
risk of harm associated with texting and driving and has acted when it
amended its assault by auto statute.103 In the concurrence’s view,
because the legislature’s action addressed only the conduct of the driver
and failed to establish any civil or criminal liability for a remote sender,
the legislature would disapprove of the majority’s extension of liability
to remote text senders. 104 However, as the concurrence concedes, while
there was no indication in the record that the legislature would have
extended liability, indication that the legislature considered the precise
issue is similarly absent. 105 This argument essentially relies on
legislative inaction, which is generally a relatively weak indicator of
legislative intent. 106
Absent legislative action, at common law it is generally the role of
the court to impose a new duty in the face of “changing social relations
and exigencies and man’s relation to his fellows.” 107 In light of text
100. Id. at 525 (Espinosa, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 503 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 520 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (“[T]he bar set by the majority for the imposition of
liability is high and will rarely be met since the duty created arises when the conduct of a person,
not in an automobile, interferes with the driver’s operation of the vehicle.”).
103. Id. at 525-26; see also supra text accompanying note 32.
104. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 525-26 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (“We have nothing before us
that reflects whether the Legislature considered legislation that would have imposed either civil
liability or criminal penalties for a remote texter who sends a distracting text message to a driver.”).
105. See id. at 525.
106. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983) (“Ordinarily, and quite
appropriately, courts are slow to attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on particular
legislation.”); see also Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional
Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 429 (1992) (“The United
States Supreme Court generally gives little weight to legislative inaction, since a variety of
reasons . . . may account for the inaction.”).
107. See Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 158 (1981) (noting that the legislature’s
refusal to impose liability on a defendant is not dispositive because the “drawing of the parameters
of tort liability has historically been a matter of common law”); Essex v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 166 N.J.
Super. 124, 127 (App. Div. 1979) (explaining how the existence of a duty at law must be flexible to
adapt to changing social conditions).
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messaging, an unprecedented method of communication that has
changed the relationships between members of society in ways that no
other form of communication could have prepared the law for, it is
reasonable for courts to impose a duty on remote text senders in
response to the foreseeable dangers that texting and driving may
potentially produce. 108 Consequently, a lack of legislative action
regarding a text sender’s liability should not dissuade a court from
imposing a duty on remote text senders because, even if a legislature’s
policy differs from that of the court, legislatures are empowered to
overturn a court’s decision if it be the will of the people. 109
IV. STATES SHOULD PERMIT VICTIMS OF ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY
TEXTING AND DRIVING TO RECOVER AGAINST REMOTE TEXT SENDERS
A. States Should Adopt Rules That Impose a Duty on Remote Text
Senders
State courts and legislatures should, in a manner similar to that of
Kubert, hold that remote persons have a duty to avoid sending text
messages to drivers if they know or have special reason to know that the
driver will view the text and become distracted. 110 For the purposes of
predictability, state legislatures should enact legislation that defines the
contours of the new duty, which will provide potential plaintiffs with a
cause of action and will provide the public with the opportunity to avoid
behaviors that will open themselves up to liability.
As Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, “[A]ny legal standard must, in
theory, be capable of being known. When a man has to pay damages, he
is supposed to have broken the law, and he is further supposed to have
known what the law was.” 111 For a sender to have notice of the
circumstances in which he might be held liable for texting a driver, he
should be able to turn to an unambiguous statement of the law. As an
illustration, New Jersey’s statute banning texting while driving sets forth
the contours of liability for drivers who violate the statute. 112 This allows
108. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 519 (“[T]he public interest requires fair measures to deter
dangerous texting while driving.”).
109. For example, tort reform acts passed by the New Jersey Legislature alter tort principles
traditionally formulated at common law. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West 2015)
(altering the recovery of damages under comparative negligence).
110. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 519 (noting that the issue of texting and driving will “become
part of the public consciousness when the liability of those involved matches the seriousness of the
harm”).
111. OLIVER W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 111 (1881).
112. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:4-97:3 (West 2013) (describing the prohibited conduct under New
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drivers to conform their conduct in accordance with this statute to avoid
liability.
B Remote Text Sender’s Duty Aligns with the Parameters Set Forth in
Palsgraf
The relational aspects of breach and duty set forth in Kubert
properly align in a manner consistent with Palsgraf so that a remote text
sender may indeed breach a duty of care to the public who use the
roadways. In Palsgraf, Judge Cardozo introduced the notion that the
elements of breach and duty must align for a plaintiff to recover even if
the defendant’s conduct actually causes the plaintiff’s injury. 113 The
events in Palsgraf take place at a train station where the guard of a
railroad car pushed a gentleman carrying a package. 114 The contents of
the package, unbeknownst to all because of its modest appearance, in
fact contained fireworks, which exploded upon impact with the
ground. 115 The plaintiff, a young woman who stood “many feet away” at
the other end of the platform, was injured from the explosion. 116 The
plaintiff sued the railroad company for the negligence of the guard, and
the court held that, while the guard owed a duty to the gentleman
carrying the package, it was not foreseeable that the apparently harmless
package “had in it the potency of peril to persons thus removed.” 117
Therefore, even though the plaintiff indeed suffered an injury because of
the guard’s negligence, it was not foreseeable that his actions would
cause harm to anyone other than the possessor of the package, and
therefore he could not have breached a duty that he did not owe to the
plaintiff. 118
While a potential victim of an automobile accident would be far
removed from the source of the careless conduct similar to the plaintiff
in Palsgraf, it is “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived [that] defines the
duty to be obeyed.” 119 In Palsgraf, the guard did not owe a duty to the
plaintiff because it was not foreseeable ex ante that he would, by
Jersey’s texting-while-driving statute).
113. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001)
(“Cardozo’s achievement was to align the relational significance of risk, as a foreseeable effect on
another, with the relational nature of tortious wrongdoing as the violation of the plaintiff’s right.”).
114. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 340-41 (N.Y. 1928).
115. Id. at 341.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 345 (“Negligence, like risk, is . . . a term of relation. Negligence in the abstract,
apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all.”).
119. Id. at 344.
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shoving the owner of the package, carelessly set in motion the series of
events which caused a hidden but dangerous instrumentality to explode
and injure the plaintiff. 120 However, unlike the guard in Palsgraf, the
sender of a text will be held liable only if he is aware that the recipient is
driving an automobile that, when operated carelessly, can foreseeably
cause substantial harm to others in the immediate proximity. 121 Further,
even though the instrumentalities in both cases are potentially
dangerous, in the case of texting a driver it is foreseeable that an
automobile, because of its known and dangerous potentialities, will give
notice to the actor ex ante of the “risk reasonably to be perceived.” 122
Thus, because the sender of a text can perceive the risk to others when
she sends a text knowing that the recipient is operating a dangerous
instrumentality, it is not unfair to impose a duty upon the sender to
refrain from engaging in an activity that has the potential to harm the
public who use the roadways. 123
C. Proving Negligence of a Remote Text Sender Under Kubert 124
There are essentially two prongs that must be satisfied regarding a
sender’s state of mind before the sending of a text may be considered a
tortious action rendering the sender liable to a third party under
Kubert. 125 First, the sender must have known or had special reason to
know that the recipient was driving at the time he sent the text. 126
Second, the sender must have known or had special reason to know that
the driver is likely to view the message while driving. 127 A plaintiff may
120. Id. at 342 (“To the eye of ordinary vigilance, the bundle is abandoned waste, which may
be kicked or trod on with impunity.”).
121. See id. at 344 (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”).
122. Remote text senders should have notice that the recipient-driver is engaging in a
potentially dangerous activity since many States require that all drivers obtain automobile insurance.
See, e.g., State v. McCourt, 131 N.J. Super. 283, 286 (App. Div. 1974) (“[T]he State requires an
owner of a dangerous instrumentality such as an automobile, as a condition precedent to use the
State’s highway, to ensure compensation for damages to others that may be sustained as a result
thereof.”).
123. Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 517 (App. Div. 2013) (explaining that it is not unfair
to hold a sender responsible for distracting a driver when he or she knows that the recipient is
driving and will read the text while driving).
124. Although the court in Kubert referenced Section 303 of the Second Restatement of Torts
to reach its holding, the Third Restatement, as the most recent Restatement of Torts, will be used
here as the model to demonstrate how Kubert could be applied in tort across jurisdictions, rather
than limiting its application.
125. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 519.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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potentially satisfy these prongs in several ways. For example, a plaintiff
will likely need to prove that the sender knew that the recipient was
likely to view the text from circumstantial evidence or because he had
special reason to know based on prior experience, a personal relationship
between the sender and driver, or “otherwise.” 128 Because of the degree
of interrelatedness between the prongs, it is likely that the evidence a
plaintiff presents will be sufficient to satisfy both.
There are several approaches in which a plaintiff might be able to
satisfy either or both prongs under Kubert. Testimony may reveal that
the sender knew that the recipient was likely to view the text and/or that
the recipient was driving. 129 Alternatively, the content of the exchange of
texts between the sender and driver may be a reliable means of
establishing that the sender both knew the recipient was driving and
actually viewed the text based on a response to the sender’s text.130 Also,
the plaintiff might present evidence that the sender knew, from prior
experience, about the recipient’s habit of viewing texts while driving or
of the recipient’s commuting habits. 131 Finally, evidence of certain
personal relationships should permit a factfinder to infer that the sender
had “special reason to know” under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 132
1. A Plaintiff May Prove a Sender’s Negligence by Offering the
Contents of the Relevant Exchange of Texts
Absent a “special reason to know” based on a personal relationship
between sender and recipient, a plaintiff may, through discovery, offer
evidence of a sender’s breach if the plaintiff obtains the content of the
relevant exchange of texts between the sender and the recipient. 133
128. See id. at 517 (noting that “special reason to know” in the context of breach references a
“personal relationship,” “prior texting experience,” or “otherwise”).
129. See id. at 520 (stating that while plaintiffs had presented testimony, it was insufficient to
establish that the defendant was aware that the driver would view the defendant’s text while
driving).
130. Julia Blackmon, Case Note, Oops, I Sent it Again!, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 59, 67
(2014) (“Had the plaintiffs been able to obtain and examine the messages [between the sender and
driver], seconds before the [driver’s] accident, the plaintiffs might have been able to prove that [the
sender] knew or had reason to know that the [recipient] was driving when she texted him.”).
131. See, e.g., L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76, 89 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting N.J.R. EVID.
406) (“Evidence, whether corroborated or not, of habit or routine practice is admissible to prove that
on a specific occasion a person . . . acted in conformity with the habit or practice.”).
132. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 517; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT.
HARM scope note to §§ 17-19 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that res ipsa loquitur can be seen
as a rule of evidence based on circumstantial evidence which permits a plaintiff to prove that the
defendant breached his duty).
133. For example, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may generally “serve on
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Alternatively, if a plaintiff is unable to obtain the texts from the sender
or recipient, the plaintiff may, perhaps with some difficulty, subpoena
the messages directly from the cellular service provider. 134 Indeed, in the
federal district courts, case law concerning the discoverability of texts
has yet to be developed. 135 Nevertheless, assuming that texts may be
discovered and admitted into evidence, a court would be tasked with
determining whether the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the sender knew the recipient was
driving and would view the incoming text. 136
Because the Kubert court held that the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs was insufficient to hold the defendant-sender liable, there is an
absence of precedent regarding the type of evidence that would be
sufficient to prove that the sender knew the recipient was driving and
would view the text. 137 However, because the court does elaborate on the
evidence insufficient to impose liability, the opinion may still offer
guidance on the requisite evidence needed to prove breach. 138
Particularly, in Kubert, the plaintiffs presented evidence on the habits of
the remote sender and recipient-driver regarding the frequent exchange
of texts that occurred on the day of the incident.139 In addition, the court
any other party a request . . . to produce and permit the requesting party to copy . . . electronically
stored information . . . stored in any medium from which information can be obtained . . . .” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
134. In order to obtain cell phone records from the telephone company, often not a party
to the litigation, the requesting party may be required to show special circumstances
which is not established merely upon a showing that the information sought is relevant;
rather, it must be demonstrated that the information sought cannot be obtained through
other sources such as the cell phone user.
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Civil Liability Arising from Use of Cell Phone While Driving, 36 A.L.R.
6TH 443(2008).
135. Erin M. Secord, Note, Exploring Challenges With the Discovery of Text Messages in
Federal Cases Through the Lens of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11, 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 143, 163 (2010)
(“Case law regarding text messages is largely undeveloped, leaving an expansive canvas upon
which future courts may craft the jurisprudence in this area.”).
136. See Juan A. Albino, Do Defendants Have a Privacy Interest in Their Cell Phone’s Text
Messages and E-mails?, 44 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE P.R. 383, 395
(2009) (explaining that, under the federal rules of evidence, there are five hurdles that a party must
overcome when offering texts as evidence: relevance, authenticity, hearsay, the “best evidence
rule,” and probative value).
137. Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 520 (App. Div. 2013) (“[The Kuberts] failed to
develop evidence tending to prove that [the sender] not only knew that [the recipient] was driving
when she texted him . . . but that [the sender] knew [the driver] would violate the law and
immediately view and respond to [the sender’s] text.”).
138. See id. at 519-20.
139. Id. (“In this case, plaintiffs developed evidence pertaining to the habits of [the recipient]
and [the sender] in texting each other repeatedly. They also established that the day of the accident

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 6

374

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:353

reiterated that the defendant only sent one text to the recipient while he
was driving, that the content of that text were unknown, and that there
was an absence of testimony supporting the conclusion that the
defendant knew the recipient was driving and would view the text. 140
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s evidence, which merely
demonstrated a routine pattern of texting between the sender and
recipient, was insufficient to prove that the sender knew the recipient
was driving and would view the incoming text. 141
As Kubert demonstrates, it will likely be difficult for a plaintiff to
prove a sender’s state of mind. 142 State of mind is often proved by
presenting circumstantial evidence, and in the case of proving that a
remote sender knew whether the recipient would be driving and view a
text, the most reliable evidence would likely be the content of the
exchanged texts. 143 For example, a recipient-driver who responds “I’m
driving” should give the sender sufficient knowledge that the recipient is
both driving and has viewed the sender’s text. 144 Moreover, even if a
recipient’s responsive text does not explicitly state that the recipient is
driving, a plaintiff may nonetheless demonstrate that a sender should
have at least had constructive knowledge based on the content of an
earlier exchange of texts. 145 Specifically, if a plaintiff submits evidence
was not an unusual texting day for the two.”).
140. Id. at 520 (“[Defendant] sent only one text while [the recipient] was driving. The contents
of that text are unknown. No testimony established that she was aware [the recipient] would violate
the law and read her text as he was driving, or that he would respond immediately.”).
141. Id. (“The evidence of multiple texting at other times when [the recipient] was not driving
did not prove that [the sender] breached the limited duty we have described.”).
142. Cf. State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 551 (1986) (“[S]tate of mind is often the most difficult
element of a crime to prove because many crimes are unwitnessed and even if a witness is present,
the witness can only surmise the actor’s state of mind.”); see also David P. Leonard, The Use of
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge, 81 NEB. L. REV. 115, 122 (2002)
(“[K]nowledge is an essential element or part of the mental element of some civil claims as
well . . . .”).
143. See Gray v. Press Commc’ns, LLC, 342 N.J. Super 1, 12 (App. Div. 2001) (citing
Costello v. Ocean Cty. Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 615 (1994)) (“Rarely will direct evidence be
available to prove state of mind.”); see also Leonard, supra note 142, at 120 (“Because states of
mind almost always must be proven circumstantially, courts have long been lenient in permitting all
forms of evidence . . . to prove the mental state.”).
144. See also Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 506 (noting that because the recipient sent a text back
to the sender less than a minute after the recipient received the sender’s text, it can be inferred that
the recipient sent that text in response to the sender’s original text).
145. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 452 (1984) (“Constructive knowledge
embraces knowledge that should have been known based on information that was reasonably
available or obtainable and should have alerted a reasonably prudent person to act.”). And, as
Kubert teaches, merely offering evidence that demonstrates an earlier pattern of texting, without
disclosing the content of those texts, cannot prove that a remote sender breached his or her duty.
Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 506, 512, 519-20 (emphasizing that the content of the exchanged texts
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of the content of an exchange of texts from an earlier date at a similar
time of day where the recipient had previously responded by stating that
he was driving, the factfinder should be permitted to infer that the sender
should have known, based on prior knowledge, that the recipient was
likely to be driving at that time and would view the text. 146 This
inference should be more compelling if the content of the texts reveal
that the recipient previously informed the sender of when the recipient
was likely to be commuting. 147
On the other hand, a recipient who responds by texting “I can’t talk
because I’m about to drive” may indicate that the sender did not know
that the recipient was driving, even if she in fact was driving. Similarly,
cell phone applications exist that will automatically respond to a text by
informing the sender that the recipient is driving and cannot respond. 148
Thus, while such a response will give the sender notice that the recipient
is driving, the use of this application may cause a factfinder to presume
that the sender did not have knowledge that the recipient would view the
incoming text. 149
2. A Factfinder Should Be Permitted to Infer a Remote Sender’s
Negligence under Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Kubert, because the plaintiffs could not obtain the content of the
relevant text messages that were exchanged between the defendants, and
because the defendant’s deposition concerning the content of the
messages was taken sixteen months after the accident, the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the defendant knew or had special reason to know

was missing from the evidence).
146. Leonard explains that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), in some cases “other
crimes, wrongs, or acts” will demonstrate that the actor had knowledge at the time of the earlier
crime, wrong, or act. Leonard, supra note 142, at 116, 124 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)). He
further explains that the “fact-finder is then asked to infer that the individual retained that
knowledge up to the time of the charged event.” Id. at 124.
147. See id. (“In some cases, the inference of past knowledge, and in turn knowledge on the
occasion in question, will be very strong.”).
148. For example, AT&T offers a smart-phone application that automatically responds to a
text message when the vehicle moves faster than 25 m.p.h., which informs the sender that the
recipient is driving and cannot respond. AT&T, AT&T DriveMode Factsheet and Q&A, AT&T
(2013), https://www.att.com/Common/about_us/txting_driving/ att_drivemode_factsheet.pdf.
149. See Andrew Oliva, Case Comment, Kubert v. Best et. al.: Massachusetts Ramifications of
the Recent Remote Texting Liability Case in New Jersey, 1 BEARING WITNESS: J. ON LAW AND SOC.
RESP. 59, 60 (2013) (“[I]t is important to note that not only must the sender of the text message
know that the recipient will read the message, but they must also know that the recipient will read it
while driving.”).
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that the recipient was both driving and would view the text message. 150
However, under res ipsa loquitur, even if the content of the texts cannot
be obtained, a plaintiff should nonetheless be entitled to an inference that
the sender breached his duty based on certain special relationships
between the sender and the driver because it should have given the
sender “special reason to know.” 151 Moreover, application of res ipsa
loquitur would not be unfair in this context because the content of the
texts might be difficult to obtain; thus, it will encourage the defendant to
disclose this crucial evidence, which might rebut the inference and bar
the plaintiff’s res ipsa loquitur claim. 152
In a jurisdiction applying the Third Restatement’s formulation of
res ipsa loquitur, “The factfinder may infer that the defendant has been
negligent when the accident causing the plaintiff’s harm is a type of
accident that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a class of
actors of which the defendant is the relevant member.” 153 In an action
against a text sender, this suggests that the class of actors of which the
defendant is a relevant member should constitute text senders who
possess a personal or special relationship with the recipient driver. 154
Further, the Third Restatement explains that “[a]n actor in a special
relationship with another owes a duty . . . to third parties with regard to
risks posed by the other that arise within the scope of the
150. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 506-7 (“[T]he necessary evidence to prove breach of the
remote texter’s duty is absent on this record . . . .”).
151. See id. at 517 (noting that when the sender has “special reason to know” that the driver
will view the text based on a “personal relationship,” he has breached his duty of care by distracting
the driver because he was in a position to discover the risk of harm).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Ridolfi, 318 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1963) (explaining that when
res ipsa loquitur is applied, the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence to
demonstrate that the accident was not due to his or her fault); see also Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J.
175, 192 (2005) (citing Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 289 (1984)) (“[Res ipsa]
places a strong incentive on the party with superior knowledge to explain the cause of an accident
and to come forward with evidence in its defense.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. &
EMOT. HARM § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“In at least a few jurisdictions, res ipsa loquitur creates a
rebuttable presumption, thereby requiring the defendant to come forward with some exculpatory
evidence or suffer a judgment as a matter of law.”).
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
154. The Third Restatement states that “[i]n limited circumstances . . . [i]f two parties have an
ongoing relationship pursuant to which they share responsibility for a dangerous activity, and if an
accident happens establishing the negligence of one of the two, imposing res ipsa loquitur liability
on both is proper.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST. 2010). While it may ordinarily be the case that only the recipient-driver engages in a
dangerous activity by texting and driving, he cannot do so without the participation of the remote
text sender. Thus, because a remote sender may also be potentially held liable for the dangerous
activity of texting and driving under Kubert, if the sender and recipient have an “ongoing
relationship,” imposing res ipsa loquitur liability on both would be proper. See Kubert, 432 N.J.
Super. at 503.
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relationship.” 155 Under Kubert, a personal relationship between the
sender and recipient gives the sender “special reason to know,” which
puts the sender “in a position to discover the risk of harm.” 156 Thus, if a
sender has a special relationship with the recipient whom the sender
knows is driving, the sender has special reason to know that sending a
text might interfere with the driver’s operation of the vehicle and the
sender must take reasonable steps to prevent the driver from causing an
accident by not sending the text. 157
In addition to the evidence presented by a plaintiff, the jury should
be permitted to supplement its understanding of whether the defendant
was in a position to discover the risk of harm with its “general
experience” and “common knowledge.” 158 Thus, juries should be
entitled to apply their own experiences because both texting and driving
are commonplace activities and most jurors are more than likely familiar
with the associated risks when a person engages in both
simultaneously. 159
Further, the Third Restatement supports the principle that a remote
text sender owes an independent duty to third-party motorists when the
remote text sender has a “special reason to know” based on a personal
relationship with the driver by listing several relationships that are
sufficient to impose this duty. 160 Specifically, relationships between
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
Section 41 is entitled “Duty to Third Parties Based on Special Relationship with Person Posing
Risks” and sets forth special relationships that will give rise to a duty to third parties, including “a
parent with dependent children” and “an employer with employees.” Id.
156. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 517; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT.
HARM § 41 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (noting that the “duty imposed . . . subjects an actor to
liability for the actor’s own tortious conduct”).
157. Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 518 (noting that text senders will be held liable “for their own
negligence when they have knowingly disregarded a foreseeable risk of serious injury to others”);
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“If
the other person poses a risk of harm to third parties, the actor must take reasonable steps, in light of
the foreseeable probability and magnitude of any harm, to prevent it from occurring.”).
158. See, e.g., Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 527 (1981) (reaffirming the proposition
that a jury may be entitled to conclude from “common knowledge” that the plaintiff would not have
been injured but for the defendant’s failure to adhere to its appropriate standard of conduct); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“In
some cases, the jury can derive its understanding of the circumstances that cause a particular type of
accident from . . . general experience [and] common knowledge.”).
159. See Kahn v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82, 92 (N.J. 2009) (noting that the original basis for res ipsa
loquitur is found in cases that rest on common knowledge); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS:
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Such experience and knowledge is
especially available and helpful when the type of accident is one with which ordinary citizens are
generally familiar.”).
160. Thus, “If the actor neither knows nor should know of a risk of harm, no action [or
inaction] is required.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. c (AM. LAW
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parent and minor child and between employer and employee should
impose a duty on parents and employers not to send a text because they
are more likely to be familiar with the recipient’s schedule and their
habits while driving, which should give them special reason to know that
the minor child or employee would be driving and would view the
sender’s text while driving. 161 Similarly, a relationship between spouses
could fit into this category, because, like the aforementioned
relationships, there is “some degree of control over the other person.” 162
Accordingly, if a sender has a special relationship with the recipient, the
sender is within the “class of actors” for purposes of res ipsa loquitur,
and the factfinder should be permitted to infer that the sender was
negligent because he has special reason to know that the recipient was
driving. 163
a. Employer and Employee Relationship
Under an employer-employee relationship, and particularly when
the employee is acting within the scope of the employment, an employer
is likely to know whether an employee is driving. 164 Further, it is not
unlikely that an employer might expect the employee to promptly
respond, especially while the employee is “on the clock” or acting within
the scope of his employment. 165 Thus, employees under time constraints
INST. 2012).
161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. d-e (AM. LAW INST.
2012) (noting that the basis for the employer’s duty in relation to the employee is the employer’s
“hiring, training, supervision, and retention of employees”); see also id. (“The basis of the parents’
duty with regard to dependent children is the parents’ responsibility for child-rearing [and] their
control over their children . . . .”).
162. Cf. Wagner v. Schlue, 255 N.J. Super. 391, 395 (Law Div. 1992) (holding a husband
liable for third party’s injuries caused by his wife after he permitted her to drive intoxicated);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012)
(noting that these special relationships impose a duty because the “actor has some degree of control
over the other person”).
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 (AM. LAW INST.
2012) (noting that this section is not limited to acts of the employee that are outside of the scope of
employment).
165. However, an employer may be able to rebut the inference that the employer had “special
reason to know” that the employee would view an incoming text if the employer has a specific
policy against texting and driving. See Isaac A. Hof, Comment, Wake-up Call: Eliminating the
Major Roadblock that Cell Phone Driving Creates for Employer Liability, 84 TEMP. L.R. 701, 735
(2012) (arguing that one factor that courts may look to in determining whether the employer may
avoid being directly liable is whether an employer has an existing cell phone policy). For example,
some employers, such as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, prohibit motor carriers
from requiring or allowing drivers to text and drive while in interstate commerce and impose
penalties for violations of the rule. Limiting the use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed.
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may feel pressured or even obligated to immediately respond to their
employer’s text or email. Further, a plaintiff may enhance his argument
that the employer had a higher expectation of a timely response if it can
be shown that the employer provided an employee with a work-specific
cell phone or condoned the use of a cell phone while driving. 166 This
type of pressured communication fits squarely within the permissive
scope of Kubert, which holds that the remote employer-sender can be
liable not for actually obstructing a driver’s view, but for merely urging
that the driver view a cell phone because the employer-sender has
special reason to know, based on the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, that the driver will become distracted. 167
b. Parent and Minor Child Relationship
Similar to an employer-employee relationship, a parent is likely to
know the whereabouts of the child, and particularly, whether the child is
driving. 168 In the context of proving a parent-sender’s negligence,
parents should have “special reason to know” based on the parent-child
relationship, which exists because the parent has some degree of control
over the conduct of child, which serves as the basis for imposing
liability. 169 Specifically, parents maintain control of the child because,
especially at remote locations, parents often tend to expect an immediate
response from their child. It follows that based on this expectation, the
child might feel pressured to respond immediately. Thus, when a parent
sends a text to his child whom he knows is driving, it can be said that the
parent exerts control by “urging” the child to view and respond to the
message, thereby distracting the child. 170 In effect, while a parent-child
Reg. 59118, 59118 (Oct. 27, 2010); see also Prohibition Against Texting, 49 C.F.R § 392.80 (2016).
166. See Hof, supra note 165 (arguing that courts should look to whether the employer
“encouraged or required employees to use cell phones for work-related purposes while driving” in
determining whether an employer has breached its duty to the public); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (noting that the duty of
employers also “extends to conduct by the employee . . . when the employment facilitates the
employee causing harm to others”).
167. See Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 516 (App. Div. 2013) (“[I]f the sender knows
that the recipient is both driving and will read the text . . . the sender has knowingly engaged in
distracting conduct.”).
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(noting that, for the parent to be held liable, there must “be some specific propensity of the child, of
which the parent has notice”).
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 41 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2012)
(“The basis of the parents’ duty with regard to dependent children is the parents’ responsibility for
child-rearing [and] their control over their children . . . .”).
170. See Kubert, 432 N.J. Super. at 516, 518 (stating that text senders, who have a similar duty
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relationship might not offer direct evidence of whether a parent knew
that his child would view the message while driving, it should permit the
factfinder to infer that the parent had a special reason to know that the
child would view the text and become distracted. 171
In sum, even if the plaintiff is unable to obtain the content of the
relevant exchange of texts, the factfinder should nonetheless be
permitted to infer a sender’s negligence if the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the sender, because of the sender’s relationship with the recipient,
had special reason to know that the recipient would view the text and
thus become distracted. 172
D. Imposing a Duty on Remote Text Senders May Implicate Several
Issues
Holding senders of text messages liable may implicate insurancerelated issues. For example, if a sender is held liable, he might attempt to
shield his personal assets by filing an insurance claim, but because no
insurance provider offers a policy that specifically covers liabilities
associated with texting, senders might attempt to file claims under
existing policies. 173 Thus, unless the standard for holding a text sender
liable is onerous, the insurance industry may experience a headache
from the flood of unrelated insurance claims filed by defendant text
senders. 174
Because some states may not be prepared to permit a plaintiff to
recover against a text sender, thereby depriving the sender of his
personal assets for sending a text, courts should be reluctant to lower the

to passengers, may be held liable by “urging” a driver to remove his or her gaze from the road if
they have special reason to know that “the driver will in fact be distracted and drive negligently as a
result . . .”).
171. This inference merely serves as an alternative theory for imposing liability on the parent
for the child’s negligent driving. For example, Kentucky has adopted a statute that imputes a child’s
negligent driving on the “motor vehicle owner who causes or knowingly permits a minor under the
age of eighteen . . . to drive,” which in many cases is likely to be the parent. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
186.590 (West 2016) (imputing joint and several liability also on the person who “signed the
application” of the minor’s license allowing him or her to drive).
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 cmt. j (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) (noting that a jury will receive a res ipsa loquitur instruction if “reasonable minds can
infer that the accident is of the type that usually happens because of the negligence of the class of
actors to which the defendant belongs”).
173. On the other hand, imposing liability on a remote text sender may serve as an opportunity
for insurers to offer policy riders to cover potential liability associated with texting. See Oliva, supra
note 149 (“It is possible that insurance contracts insuring the operator of a motor vehicle could
include provisions agreeing to represent remote parties that the operator is texting . . . .”).
174. Id. (noting that Kubert’s holding will likely result in increased litigation).
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threshold when holding a text sender liable. 175 Indeed, for a sender to
have breached his duty to the public and specifically the potential victim,
courts should consider raising the burden of proof from a preponderance
standard to requiring that the victim prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the sender knew or had special reason to know that the
recipient was driving and would view the incoming text. 176 Otherwise,
not only will the floodgate be opened to a substantial increase in
litigation, whether meritorious or not, the deep pocket problem would
hold ordinary persons’ assets liable and likely overwhelm the insurance
industry as a whole with its own flood of insurance claims.
Another potential issue with imposing liability on remote text
senders is that furthering the prohibition on texting and driving may
actually increase accidents caused by texting and driving because if the
driver knows that the activity is banned, he might attempt to hide the
activity by holding his phone below his line of sight, which may cause
him to hold his gaze from the road for an even longer period of time. 177
This distraction may last long enough to significantly slow down a
person’s reaction time and increase the possibility of an accident. 178
V. CONCLUSION
Texting and driving is a dangerous activity that is responsible for
many of the avoidable accidents that occur due to distracted driving. 179
While many state legislatures have responded by enacting formal
prohibitions on texting and driving, the penalties are far less severe than
other forms of distracted driving, namely driving while intoxicated. 180
175. See id.
176. The clear and convincing evidence standard is a higher standard of proof but a lower
standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 169
(2006) (citing Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 64 N.J. Super 156, 162 (App. Div. 1960)). Specifically,
“The clear and convincing standard should produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. (citing In re Purrazzella,
134 N.J. 228, 240 (1993)).
177. See Highway Loss Data Institute, Texting Laws and Collision Claim Frequencies (2010)
(explaining that this unexpected consequence to laws banning texting while driving may make
texting and driving more dangerous if it causes drivers to take their eyes off the road more
frequently than before the ban was enacted).
178. See Quisenberry, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
179. For example, in 2013, cell phone related accidents constituted 27 percent of all
automobile accidents. Annual Estimate of Cell Phone Crashes 2013, supra note 4.
180. For example, in New Jersey the penalty for a first offense for texting and driving is a
monetary fine between $200 and $400. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.3(d) (West 2015). In contrast,
depending on the offender’s blood alcohol concentration, a first offender convicted of driving while
intoxicated is subject to a mandatory operator’s license forfeiture, imposition of an ignition
interlock, a fine between $250 and $500, and a mandatory period of detainment. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
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Because the penalties for many states and localities usually consist of a
small monetary fine, the deterrent effect on the conduct of drivers is
minimal. 181 Thus, this approach to reducing texting while driving only
addresses one-half of the prohibited conduct.
While prohibiting texting and driving on the part of the recipientdriver is the more obvious approach to addressing the issue, the very
nature of texting requires the participation of two individuals, which
suggests that the text sender’s conduct should also be addressed. The
framework that Kubert has formulated appropriately addresses the issue
of texting and driving by imposing a duty on the remote sender to refrain
from texting in inappropriate circumstances. 182 Because the threshold of
proving that a remote text sender has breached his duty is higher than
ordinary standards of conduct, Kubert’s holding offers a realistic
approach to reducing incidences of texting while driving. 183 It also
forces society to re-examine how drivers should use electronic devices
when operating an automobile. Accordingly, state courts and legislatures
should impose a duty on remote text senders, consistent with the holding
in Kubert, to not send a text to a recipient whom they know is driving
and is likely to become distracted by the incoming text. 184

39:4-50(a) (West 2015).
181. See Highway Loss Data Institute, supra note 177 (“[M]ost importantly for policy makers,
laws banning [cell phone conversations and texting] are not reducing crash risk in the United
States.”).
182. Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 503 (App. Div. 2013).
183. Id. at 520 (Espinosa, J., concurring) (“[T]he bar set by the majority for the imposition of
liability is high and will rarely be met.”).
184. See id. at 503 (majority opinion).
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